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Blair reasoned, a liquidating agent presents no obstacles to ordinary
creditor's remedies, then one is left with the question of why Congress
felt it necessary to give bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over liquidating
agents. The answer appears to be that liquidating agents do present
an obstacle to ordinary creditor remedies. As in the case of receivers,
trustees, or assignees, Blair's liquidator had authority, by virtue of
the agreement between the corporation and the Special Trust Fund, to
liquidate the corporate assets as he saw fit and not according to Blair's
dictates. 49  Therefore, it would seem reasonable to treat the appoint-
ment of a liquidating agent whose powers were as extensive as Blair's
as the equivalent of a receiver or trustee.50
While private liquidation agreements of brokerage firms are not
likely to present a section 3a(5) issue in the future,51 the Blair deci-
sion appears to have opened a door to a procedure which will permit
insolvent businesses to defeat the broad objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act. The court's decision will permit insolvent businesses to place ef-
fective control of the business's assets in the hands of private liquidating
agents and allow the liquidation process to be accomplished without
the safeguards and uniformity of administration provided for by the
Bankruptcy Act. The decision indicates that Congress will have to
amend section 3a(5) if it wants to prevent the subversion through pri-
vate liquidation agreements of the creditors' ability to invoke bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
STUART WILLIAMS
Civil Procedure-A Possible Solution to the Problem
of "Sewer Service" in Consumer Credit Actions
Notice of a lawsuit is one of the most important elements of an
individual's right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.1
Nevertheless, each day in large cities thousands of default judgments
49. See note 9 supra.
50. See 1 COLLIER I 3.503, at 503.
51. Future problems involving the insolvency of brokerage firms will be han-
dled by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1970).
See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in
Investor Protection, 24 VAND. L. REv. 586, 606-13 (1971).
1. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1950).
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are entered against consumer-debtors who have never received notice of
pending litigation.2 Despite numerous attempts to solve the problem
through changes in local rules of civil procedure,' licensing of process-
servers,4 and institution of criminal prosecutions, "sewer service" con-
tinues unabated." In November of 1972, however, the consent decree
in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.7 established procedures that
might provide a viable solution to the problem, if they were generally
implemented in similar cases. This note will outline the procedures re-
quired by this decree and examine its intended effect on the practice of
"sewer service."
BACKGROUND
"Sewer service" has been defined as the "fraudulent service of a
summons and a complaint, usually either by destroying it, by leaving it
under a door or in a mailbox, or by leaving it with a person known not to
be the defendant; and then executing an affidavit stating that the sum-
mons was personally delivered to and left with the defendant."" The
practice is common in consumer-credit actions in areas of high-volume
litigation involving relatively trivial amounts.9 Studies have revealed
its use in New York,10 Washington," Chicago,'" Boston,'
8 Detroit,' 4
and Los Angeles.' 5 Because of technicalities in the Civil Practice Laws
2. See text accompanying notes 10-16 infra.
3. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y.C. CIVIL
CT. AcT § 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. N.Y. CrrY, N.Y., LOCAL LAws No. 80 § B32-451.0 (1969).
5. DeFeis, Abuse of Process and its Impact Upon the Poor, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 1, 11 (1971); see note 30 infra.
6. See public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices Before the FTC, (Sep. 13,
1971) (testimony of David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York).
7. Civ. No. 70-179 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1972).
8. Public Hearings on Abuses in the Service of Process Before Louis J. Lefko-
witz, Attorney General of the State of New York 2 (1966) (testimony of Frank
Pannizzo, Assistant Attorney General).
9. See Comment, Sewer Service and Confessed Judgments: New Protection for
Low-Income Consumers, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Cv. LiB. L. REv. 414 (1971).
10. D. CAPLowrrz, DnBTOS IN DEFAULT (1971).
11. See Public Hearings Before the Nat'l Comm'n on Consumer Finance, (Juno
22-23, 1970) (testimony of Maribeth Holloran, Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services,
Washington, D.C.) (hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings).
12. D. CAPLowrrz, supra note 10, at 11-7; 1970 Hearings (testimony of Judson H.
Miner, Attorney, Chicago Council of Lawyers).
13. See 1970 Hearings (testimony of Blair C. Shick, Attorney, Natl Consumer
Center, Boston College Law School).
14. D. CAPLOwriZ, supra note 10, at 11-7.
15. See Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L,A.L.
REv. 883, 926 (1969).
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of New York,' the practice is more prevalent in New York City than
anywhere else.
The causes of sewer service are myriad, but foremost among them
is the very nature of the consumer-credit action. An attorney who con-
ducts a collection practice necessarily operates on a high-volume, low-
overhead basis and cannot afford to pay an adequate fee for private
service in states where it is permitted by law.1" The average fee of one
dollar and fifty cents' s for each service affected by a private process
server is little incentive to that server to search diligently for an individ-
ual.:" The fee is barely sufficient to pay for his transportation. In
jurisdictions where service must be made by an officer of the court,
such as North Carolina, 0 there is still strong incentive to use sewer
service. The process server is usually the local law enforcement offi-
cer, who thus has no financial incentive but who is likely to feel that
his time is too valuable to be spent in personally serving process on a
consumer whom he feels will be likely to take a default judgment in any
case. Consequently, there is pressure on both public and private process
servers to take the "short-cut . . . to the nearest sewer."1
2'
Sewer service is almost impossible to detect. The consumer-de-
fendants are usually unaware of their rights and accept default judgments
and wage garnishment because the amounts involved are less than the
costs of hiring an attorney. Even if a defendant attempts to vacate a
judgment on the ground that he was not served, he is faced with an almost
impossible burden of proof: he must prove by clear and convincing evi-
16. See DeFeis, supra note 5, at 4-6 and statutes cited.
17. In only three of the six jurisdictions where studies have revealed the prevalence
of sewer service is service by private party permitted in all cases. CAL. Civ. PRo.
CODE § 414.10 (West 1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. Rule 103(1) (1972); N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAw § 2103(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970). The remaining three require service to be
completed by a public officer unless a private party is specifically designated by the
court. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3902(a) (Supp. IV, 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A,
§ 103(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 223, § 27 (1971).
18. Tuekheimer, Service of Process in New York City: A Proposed End to
Unregulated Criminality, 72 COLUM. L. Rnv. 847, 861 (1972).
19. See note 21 infra.
20. N.C.R. CIV. PRo. 4(a).
21. Tuekneimer, supra note 18, at 868. Professor Tuekheimer feels that there
are two temptations that lead process servers to improper conduct: first, the remote and
disorganized nature of the victims; and secondly, the fact that "it is not easy for
process servers, almost all of whom are white, to venture alone into black neighbor-
hoods, find a specific person, inform him that he is being sued, and then hand him a
piece of paper setting in operation machinery that may end with property attachment
and income execution." Id. These temptations apply to both private and public
process servers alike.
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dence both that he was never served on that date22 and that he has a valid
defense to the creditor's claim.
23
This burden might be easier to meet in a class action. Individual
hearings usually result in a swearing contest between the consumer and
the process server. Thus, a large number of consumers, all claiming
not to have been served by a particular process-server, would serve as
much stronger circumstantial evidence that sewer service actually oc-
cured. But any possibility of a class action in federal courts is foreclosed
by Snyder v. Harris,24 which prohibits accumulating claims to reach the
jurisdictional amount in a class action. Likewise, in many states a con-
sumer class action cannot be maintained on the theory that there is in-
sufficient class interest.25
Action taken by the state and federal governments have been un-
successful, for the most part, in alleviating this situation. Procedural
reforms were instituted in New York expressly to remove the incentive
for "sewer service," but these only led to new forms of abuses. 20
A licensing ordinance was enacted in New York City to regulate
process servers and to enforce complaints 27 but the New York Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, whose responsibility it is to detect and punish
infractions, was already over-burdened with consumer-credit and land-
lord-tenant suits and could not afford to devote adequate resources to
enforce the ordinance.2"
Criminal actions have been brought by the federal government
against process servers under two statutes: for filing false affidavits of
non-military service under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
194029 or for wilfully depriving a person of his constitutional rights
22. Dineed v. Myers, 278 App. Div. 658, 102 N.Y.S.2d 596 (2d Dep't 1951);
Denning v. Lettenty, 48 Misc. 2d 185, 186, 264 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621-22 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
see United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Roth v. Perry, 158 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Saratoga County Ct. 1957).
24. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
25. E.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
26. Our experience in examining more than three hundred services reportedly
made in compliance with this new amendment belies its projected remedial
qualities. Thus we have discovered that some process servers alleging this
form of service have consistently invented the names of fictitious people who
they claim they left a copy of the summons and complaint with at the place of
employment of the person being sued.
Public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices before the FTC, (Sep. 13, 1971) (testi-
mony of David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York).
27. N.Y. CrrY, N.Y. LocAL LAws No. 80 § B32-451.0 (1969).
28. DeFeis, supra note 5, at 20.
29. 50 U.S.C. § 520(1) (1970) requires as a condition precedent to default judg-
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under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.3" These actions have been singularly
unsuccessful; the majority have resulted in suspended sentences and rel-
atively small fines"' while only one has resulted in a prison sentence.32
In United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.33 the federal government
launched a different attack against sewer service. Brand, which had
brought the third largest number of lawsuits of any plaintiff in the civil
court of the City of New York, had been the subject of a study that re-
vealed that it had engaged in a long-standing practice of predatory sales
tactics.34 Its salesmen would go from door to door, or to the factories
on payday, selling overpriced watches and rings on "easy credit" terms
with no downpayment required. Many of its customers never received
a copy of the contract or even a payment book.35  In 1964 Brand se-
cured 5,360 default judgments, 97.7 percent of the total suits it brought.
Often the first notice that consumer-debtors ever received of these actions
was when their employers gave them notice of the execution of the judg-
ment on their income.m
The United States brought suit37 against Brand Jewelers, its at-
ment that the plaintiff file an affidavit stating that the defendant is not a member of
the armed forces. If the defendant is in the military, the act requires an attorney to
be appointed for him. If the plaintiff is unable to ascertain whether or not the de-
fendant is in the military, the court may require him to file a bond. If the plaintiff
does not obtain such an affidavit, the judgment may be voided by the defendant.
50 U.S.C. § 520(2) (1970) makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly file a false
affidavit under this section.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
31. E.g., United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (constitutional
issues raised on motion to dismiss indictment); United States v. Lindsay, Cr. No.
68-994 (S.D.N.Y., filed and entered nolle prosequi June 30, 1971); United States v.
Tauber, Cr. No. 70-25 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 23, 1971) (pleaded guilty to four counts of
mail fraud, fined $1000); United States v. Bialo, Cr. No. 68-888 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 3,
1971) (one year suspended sentence); United States v. Kaufman, Cr. No. 70-406
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 1971) (one year suspended sentence); United States v. Rick,
Cr. No. 68-994 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 12, 1969) (one year suspended sentence); United
States v. Wiseman, Cr. No. 68-994 (S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1969) (one year suspended
sentence.
32. United States v. Siegel, Cr. No. 72-2416 (2d Cir., judgment affirmed Feb. 22,
1973 (6 month sentence for violation of 50 U.S.C. § 520: knowingly filing a false
affidavit of non-military service.)
33. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. D. CAPLOWrrZ, supra note 10, at 7-21 to 7-24.
35. Id. at 7-26.
36. Id. at 11-8.
37. The United States invoked the federal court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345 (1970). The cause of action was extraordinary in that the government's standing
was based on no specific federal statute, but rather on the general right of the federal
government to resort to its own courts to vindicate a substantial federal interest. See
Note, The United States Government Has Standing to Sue for the Violation of Four-
teenth Amendment Rights of an Individual, 37 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 426 (1971); Note,
Federal Government May Sue to Protect Due Process Rights of "Sewer Service" Vic-
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torney, and various process servers to vacate all unlawfully obtained de-
fault judgments, to obtain restitution,38 and to enjoin the further use of
"sewer service." The Government alleged that Brand and the other
defendants, "as a matter of long-standing and systematic practice," had
an understanding by which the process-serving defendants knew that
personal service was "neither expected nor desired by Brand" and that
Brand and its attorney knew or had reason to know of this practice.8 0
Brand's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing was denied on
two grounds. First, the court felt that the government had a sufficient
interest since the alleged activities of the defendants had resulted in
interference with interstate commerce. Alternatively, the court based
standing upon the government's interest in ending "widespread depriva-
tions (i.e., deprivations affecting many people) of property through
'state action' without due process of law."40 Brand did not appeal, and
two years later the action was finally settled by the consent decree. 1
THE DECREE
The consent decree was divided into two sections. The first set
forth a procedure for the vacation of all default judgments obtained from
January 1, 1969, to December 31, 1971, while the second part attempted
to insure proper notice of future litigation. The first section required the
United States Attorney to write to each judgment debtor to inform him
of his right to have the judgment vacated and to secure a trial on the
merits. The debtor could secure these rights by simply returning a
stamped postcard included in the letter from the Government. If the
debtor requested a trial, Brand was to account for and return with in-
terest any excess funds previously received.
tims, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 367 (1971); Note, United States Has Standing to Seek Injcnc-
lion Against Practice of Obtaining Default Judgments Through False Affidavits Certify-
ing Service of Process, 24 VAND. L. Rav. 829 (1971); Note, A New Approach to Legal
Assistence for Ghetto Residents or an Invitation to Executive Lawmaking?, 17 WAYNE
L. REV. 1287 (1971); Note, Nonstatutory Standing to Sue on the Part of the United
States Under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 665.
38. The federal government sought to require Brand Jewelers to bring the actions
against consumers de novo in the state court. Brand Jewelers was to account for all
amounts collected pursuant to the first judgment and repay amounts in excess of the
new judgment to the consumers with 6% interest running from the date of collection.
318 F. Supp. at 1295.
39. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 20-21, United States v. Brand Jewelers,
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
40. 318 F. Supp. at 1299.
41. Consent Decree, United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., Civ. No. 70-179
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Consent Decree].
1522 [Vol. 51
SEWER SERVICE
The second part of the decree attempted to control the problem
of sewer service in the future.42 First, it imposed broad duties upon
Brand's attorney to insure the correctness of service in all future con-
sumer-credit suits, and secondly, it required him to follow specific pro-
cedures in monitoring the service of process and investigating allega-
tions of fraudulent service.
Four duties were imposed upon the plaintiff's attorney under this
plan. First, he must investigate every situation where he has "good
cause to believe that service of process was not lawfully made or that
the affidavit of service of process was not lawfully made or that the
affidavit of service or of non-military service was fraudulently made."4
Secondly, he has the duty to monitor the manner in which process is
assigned and accomplished to ascertain whether all steps are being taken
to insure proper service. 44 Thirdly, he must move to vacate any judg-
ment when there is substantial evidence of unlawful service.45  Finally,
he must switch process-serving agencies when there is evidence that it
is serving false affidavits.46 The effect of these four provisions is to
render Brand's attorney subject to criminal prosecution for the federal
crimes of mail fraud47 or of causing non-military affidavits to be filed
with the knowledge that they were false,48 by removing the defense of
lack of knowledge.49
The decree prescribes specific steps to insure that the creditor-plain-
tiff's attorney complies with that duty. In order to understand how
these proceedings have altered Brand's usual procedure for suing in con-
sumer-credit transactions, it is expedient to trace a hypothetical suit
brought under this new procedure.
Assume that Brand is owed one hundred dollars by consumer C,
who has stopped making payments on this debt. Brand turns the cus-
tomer's file over to its attorney, A, who files a complaint in civil court
requesting judgment for the one hundred dollar debt plus costs. The
clerk gives A a docket number, and A then takes the complaint and
gives it to a private process-serving agency. The agency would norm-
42. This part of the decree is operative from January 1, 1973 until December 31,
1975, and may be extended for a period of 3 years if any party is judged in contempt.
Consent Decree f 23.
43. Consent Decree 1 10.
44. Consent Decree ff 11.
45. Consent Decree 12.
46. Consent Decree f 13.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
48. 50 U.S.C. § 520(2) (1970).
49. See Tuekheimer, supra note 18, at 867.
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ally take all responsibility for serving the process and for executing the
affidavits of service and non-military service.50 A would then file these
as his proof of service, wait ten days, and move for default judgment. 1
Instead, under this decree, when A hands the docketed complaint over
to an agency he must record in a log the name of the agency and the
name and license number of the process server to whom the complaint
is given for service. When service is completed, A must also enter the
date, precise time and mode of service, and if substitute service is made
on a person of suitable age and discretion, the name and address of the
person served and his relationship to the party sued. When proof of
service is filed, the affidavit must include the precise time of service.
If C suffers a default judgment as a result of sewer service the speci-
ficity of the information in the log and affidavit makes it simpler for C
to refute the allegations of service in a hearing to vacate judgment.52
Thus this procedure provides a means to rectify sewer service once it
occurs. But if the decree stopped at this point, it would not have solved
the problem of the vast majority of consumers who are entirely unaware
of their rights, who are unable to afford an attorney, and who therefore
never get as far as a hearing.
Again, assume that A has filed his proof of service. Normally he
would merely wait the requisite ten days and then move for default
judgment. Under this decree, however, within five working days from
proof of service A must write a letter to C at the address where he was
alleged to have been served. The letter must inform C in Spanish as
well as English of the fact that he is being sued, of all the relevant de-
tails of the alleged service of process, and that if he has not been so
50. So long as there is no direct proof of knowledge by the attorney that sewer
service has taken place, he is not criminally liable. See United States v. Kalkin, Cr.
No. 69-864 (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 15, 1971) (conviction of attorney for mail fraud not di-
rectly related to sewer service when indictment under 1866 Civil Rights Act, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1970), failed for lack of knowledge); United States v. Shenghit, Cr.
No. 71-928 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1971) (attorney pled guilty to charge of causing
non-military affidavits to be filed with knowledge they were false).
51. N.Y.C. CviL Cr. Acr § 402 (McKinney 1963).
52. Under current New York procedure, the affidavit of personal service need
only state the date on which service was completed and, if substitute service is made
on a person of suitable age and discretion at the defendant's place of work or residence,
need not state the person's name, description, or even sex. Thus under current pro-
cedure, in order to prove he was not served, C must prove he was not home at all
on the date service was alleged. See Tuekheimer, supra note 18, at 854-55. Moreover,
if service was alleged on a person of suitable age and discretion, then C must prove
that no one was home on that date. The information given by the logs that A must
maintain limits the number of times at which and persons upon whom service might
have been effected, and thus substantially reduces his burden of proof. See text ac-
companying note 22 -upra.
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served, he should indicate that fact by signing and mailing a postcard
included in the letter. It also must explain his obligation to respond, the
possibilities of default judgment and garnishment with their adverse ef-
fects on his credit rating, and the availability of free legal assistance.
There are then three possible events that could occur: C could
receive A's letter but not return the postcard; C could receive the letter
and return the postcard to A; or the letter could be returned to A
stamped "Addressee Unknown." The decree provides a separate pro-
cedure for each case.
In the first situation if C does not file an answer, A must wait
thirty days from the date of the letter's delivery before filing his petition
for default judgment. He must also file an affidavit swearing that he
has mailed the letter as required by the decree. Under these circum-
stances it is safe to assume that C had decided to permit default judgment
against him. The requirements of the Spanish translation, the deletion
of the merchant's name from the envelope53 and the use of certified
mail virtually insure that the letter was read and understood. C is thus
in a position to know his rights and to be able to decide rationally whether
or not to litigate the claim.
What if C receives the letter, but returns the postcard to A and
claims that process was never served on him? Then the decree requires
that A enter C's name in a log of parties who have claimed that they were
not properly served, along with the name of the process server who al-
legedly made the service. He must then discontinue the lawsuit and start
again. However, since A may now safely assume that C is aware of
his intent to sue, the decree does not require A to write C a letter
in the second suit, but instead allows him to proceed, after proof of
second service, to file an affidavit of compliance and petition for
default judgment. This procedure assures that C is aware of his
rights and is on notice that the merchant is suing him. At the same time
the procedure prevents the possible abuse of C's repeated return of the
postcard to postpone the suit indefinitely.
What if A's letter is returned stamped "Addressee Unknown"?
When he receives a returned letter, the decree requires that A make a
full investigation to ascertain what has occurred. C may have moved
53. Brand was found in Professor Caplowitz's study to have utilized insulting
letters and phone calls, threats to contact and the actual contact of friends and relatives
and, most frequently, employers. This provision assures that the consumer does not
discard the letter, believing it to be another of these insulting letters. D. CAPLovrrZ,
supra note 10, at 10-16.
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since service was made, may have refused delivery, or may, in fact, have
been the victim of sewer service. The lawsuit is to be delayed until A
determines that C was indeed residing at the address appearing on the
letter at the time the service was attempted and until A has made a good
faith determination that there is no reason to believe that the party
sued did not receive legal notice. A must enter the name and the ad-
dress appearing on the returned letters in a journal that will be subject
to periodic inspection by the United States Attorney's Office. A is also
required to record the nature, details, and conclusions of every investi-
gation made therein. Only when A has made this good faith determin-
ation that C has received notice may he file an affidavit of compliance
and petition for default judgment.
Under current New York procedure, once A obtains a default judg-
ment he may obtain an income execution. 4 He would then deliver the
income execution to the City Marshall, who would give it to C's em-
ployer.5 5 Ordinarily C would not learn about execution until his pay-
check was reduced by ten percent. Under the decree, however, A must
write C at least ten days prior to income execution informing him in
Spanish as well as in English of the pending proceedings. Thus C is
given a final chance to pay the judgment or to contest it in a hearing
to reopen the judgment.
The procedure of the decree discourages sewer service in two ways:
by an in terrorem effect caused by greater enforceability of criminal
sanctions against the process-server and Brand's attorney and by an
economic effect caused by the increased costs to the plaintiff or bring-
ing suit.
The procedures of the decree provide the state and federal author-
ities with an excellent source of evidence for use against the process-
servers in criminal prosecutions.5 By examining the records of process
allegedly served by a particular process-server on a certain day, for
example, it might be possible to show that the process-server claimed to
have been in two places at the same time. The returned letters and
subsequent investigations might reveal that he claimed personal service
54. N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAw § 5231 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
55. Id.
56. A process-server who commits sewer service may be guilty of federal crimes:
e.g., aiding and abetting wilful subjection of an individual to the deprivation of his
constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), see United States v. Wiseman,
445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 967 (1971); mail fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1970); filing a false affidavit of non-military service under 50 U.S.C. § 502(2)
(1970). He may also be guilty of committing such state crimes as perjury and fraud.
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upon someone who had been dead two years or was abroad on the date
service was alleged. 57 These records have the advantage of ready avail-
ability and low cost to the authorities. The government may easily
monitor the process-serving industry without great expense. Thus the
process-servers have a strong incentive to make actual service.
Brand's attorney shares this incentive. Under the terms of the decree
he may be punished by a contempt citation if he does not monitor the
method by which process is served. But when he does monitor the
method of service he is chargeable with knowledge of any sewer service
that occurs and may be prosecuted under the 1866 Civil Rights Act,"
for wilfully depriving an individual of his constitutional rights.
The procedures of the decree are also designed to decrease the
profits the process-serving agencies derive from utilizing "sewer service."
An attorney involved in the collection of small debts from consumers
would naturally desire to keep his transaction costs as low as possible.59
Normally he would seek to minimize costs by employing the process-
serving agency that gave the quickest, cheapest service-inevitably that
which employed "sewer service" most frequently. The procdures under
this decree effectively prohibit Brand's attorney from reducing his costs
in this way by requiring him to put each agency on notice that he will
change to another if he finds it to be employing sewer service.6" The
process-serving agency is thus given an economic incentive to complete
service of process if it wishes to maintain its account with Brand.
The procedures of the decree, however, increase Brand's costs of
litigation irregardless of its use of "sewer service." The agencies will
charge Brand's attorney a higher fee for effecting service in the manner
required. The amount of paperwork that Brand's attorney must com-
plete to maintain the suit is greatly increased. 61 Ultimately Brand's at-
torney will pass these costs on to his client. Thus Brand will be required
57. Instances such as these are quite commonplace in New York and Chicago.
See Public Hearings on Debt Collection Practices Before the FTC, (testimony of
David Paget, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York) at 6-7;
1970 Hearings (testimony of Judson H. Miner, Attorney, Chicago Council of Lawyers)
at 2-6.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
59. See text accompanying note 17, eupra.
60. Consent Decree 14.
61. The decree requires that four separate logs be maintained, and that letters
be sent to each defendant. Each time a letter is returned unanswered it must be in-
vestigated, and the attorney must make a good faith determination of its results.
Before a default judgment can issue, the attorney himself must review the case and
swear in an affidavit that he has followed all the required procedures. Consent Decree
If 2, 7.
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to bear this burden of higher costs for the duration of the decree, no
matter how accurately its agents complete service. Since this will hardly
serve in itself as an incentive for accurate service, it can only be justified
as the cost necessary to implement the procedure.
FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DECREE
This decree may prove useful in the future either as a model decree
for similar litigation or as a model for a statute. 2 Although restricting
its use to a model decree would have the advantage of preventing the
burden of increased cost from falling on honest merchants, such a
restricted use would have severe disadvantages. The problems of litigat-
ing each case are too great,63 and sewer service is too widespread in that
segment of the consumer-credit industry catering to low-income con-
sumers64 for a case-by-case attack to be effective.
If these procedures were applied by a narrowly drawn statute-for
example, one applicable only to consumer-credit actions-the burden
of increased costs would inevitably fall on some honest merchants, as
well as those who employ "sewer service." Clearly, any legislature con-
sidering statutory adoption of these procedures would have to balance
the burdens of increased costs against the benefits from the elimination
of "sewer service."
There are several basic policies that would seem to support imposi-
tion of this burden upon the merchant. This burden would fall most
heavily on those merchants who rely on default judgments and garnish-
ment proceedings to collect their debts. These merchants are most likely
to be engaged in high-risk credit sales to low-income individuals. Al-
though it has long been thought desirable to stimulate trade,65 public
policy favors strict regulation and even discouragment of the "no money
down," "easy credit" sales industry because of its predatory nature.66
Furthermore, although the courts should be as accessible as possible to
62. See note 68 infra.
63. Proof of a "long standing and systematic practice" as was alleged in Brand,
see text accompanying note 39 supra, requires an extensive study. In addition other
jurisdictions may be unwilling to grant the federal government standing, see note 37
supra.
64. See notes 10-16 supra.
65. One major policy of the law of negotiable instruments under the U.C.C.,
for example, is to decrease the expense and increase the speed of actions for a creditor
to secure payments. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
66. See Peterson, Representing the Consumer Interest in the Federal Government,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1966).
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litigants, 67 the court dockets are already much too crowded to require
the courts to function as glorified collection agencies. Indeed, there
is a very strong policy in favor of encouraging private settlement of dis-
putes. 8 In any case, the burden would fall most heavily on those mer-
chants who repeatedly resort to the courts. Consequently, the policy of
encouraging private settlement would be furthered, while the courts
would remain open to settle bona fide disputes.
Merchants will no doubt attempt to pass this burden on to the con-
sumer who buy their products. The procedure of the decree incerases
costs of those merchants who cater to low-income individuals more than
those who sell to wealthier customers. This increase may in turn be
passed on to high-risk consumers who are already plagued by higher-
than-average prices, or it may discourage sales to these individuals al-
together. The legislature should weigh this possibility as well in deter-
mining the desirability of enacting this procedure. Ultimately the de-
cision should rest upon policy decisions based on empirical data gained
from the results in the Brand Jewelers case.0 9 If the experience gained
from the Brand Jewelers decree shows that it is possible through its im-
plementation to reduce "sewer service" without substantially increasing
the costs of goods bought by the inhabitants of lower income neighbor-
hoods and without unduly burdening the innocent merchant, then clearly
these procedures would be well worth adopting on a statutory basis for
all consumer-credit actions.
7 0
JAMES STODDARD HAYES, JR.
67. One major policy in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to make the
courts more open to all litigants. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1944).
68. The U.C.C. reflects this policy in its encouragement of "cover" rather than
suit. Compare UNiFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712 with UNEFoRM COMmRCIAL
CODE § 2-713.
69. The New York Bar Association Committee on Consumer Affairs is presently
considering a proposal to codify the procedures outlined in this decree, but have
postponed final determination until such time as the results of the Brand Jewelers
Decree can be studied. Interview with David Paget, Chairman of the New York Bar
Association Committee on Consumer Affairs, by telephone, February 5, 1973.
70. It is safe to state that the toll which sewer service and the default judg-
ments and wage garnishments, which almost ineluctable follow in its wake,
exact, demonstrably include the loss of employment, increased personal in-
debtedness, personal bankruptcies, disruption and splintering of family life, the
fostering of fraudulent and predatory sales practices, the frustration and
hindrance of numerous Government programs designed to aid the urban
poor, the impairment of the integrity of the judicial system and an erosion in
respect for the rule of law.
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., Civ. No. 70-170
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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